

SECRET

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Notes on the IAC References in the Dulles Report

CIA's Position

Conclusions:

ON PAGE 27: "The Central Intelligence Agency should be empowered and encouraged to establish, through its Director, closer liaison with the two members of the National Security Council on whom it chiefly depends; namely, the Secretaries of State and Defense."

We do not understand how
Is he "empowered" by all the members of the National Security Council to do this with two of their members, or "encouraged" to do this by them, or by the IAC? *He has frequent contacts with both*

ON PAGE 63: Another important area (where more active efforts at coordination are needed) is that of domestic intelligence and counterintelligence, in so far as they relate to the national security. To improve coordination in this area, and between it and the entire intelligence field, we recommend that the FBI should be made a member of the IAC".

We are checking on the actual facts pertaining to the FBI withdrawal from the former IAB, but as yet have found nothing showing that they formerly were a permanent member. The last meeting that they attended was August 26, 1946. It is provided, nowadays, that they can be invited to attend meetings pertaining to matters in which they are concerned. *We think the*

"The Director of Central Intelligence should be made permanent chairman of the United States Communications Intelligence Board."

The DCI prefers not to be chairman. He thinks the present

SECRET

SECRET

system of rotating chairmen is working out satisfactorily.

"The Intelligence Advisory Committee is soundly conceived, but it should participate more actively with the Director of Central Intelligence in the continuing coordination of intelligence activities."

The IAC, nowadays, is meeting more regularly for coordination purposes, and there is more joint preparation now for the Secretary of Defense briefings, AEC, Senate and House Reports, etc.

"The Intelligence Advisory Committee should consist of the Director of Central Intelligence, and the representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the FBI. Other departments and agencies would sit as ad hoc members when appropriate".

The DCI is opposed to dropping from the IAC, either the JIG or the AEC.

ON PAGE 81: "Under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence, these estimates should be submitted for discussion and approval by the reconstituted IAC, whose members should assume collective responsibility for them."

The DCI considers *Some of* ~~our~~ estimates are now discussed with the IAC Agencies (not necessarily with the IAC Members themselves), and that when a concurrence is received from an IAC Agency, that constitutes a part of "collective responsibility".

"Provision should be made in these arrangements for the handling of crisis situations when coordinated estimates are required without delay."

The example cited in the Report has been given consideration and arrangements have been made among the IAC Members to avoid recurrence in the future and more satisfactory handling of "crisis situations."

SECRET

SECRET

"Coordinated intelligence estimates produced in this way, must in order to be effective, be recognized as the most authoritative estimates available to the policy makers".

If an estimate has been produced and disseminated by CIA, it is out of their hands and we cannot assure how it will be received by the recipient. We do attempt to bring about credence in CIA estimates.

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ON PAGE 149: "There should be effective coordination between the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee in the field of military estimates and that of the Central Intelligence Agency and Intelligence Advisory Committee in the field of national estimates".

We now assist in military estimates of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and the Joint Intelligence Committee can dissent from CIA estimates through the military departments, or through their representative on the IAC. We think this coordination is working effectively.

ON PAGE 161: "The State Department will have to decide whether any of these recommendations are to affect the IAC or just the internal affairs of the State Department".

SECRET